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The Constitutional Rights of Corporations
Revisited:
Social and Political Expression and the
Corporation after First National Bank v. Bellotti
CHARLES R. O'KELLEY, JR.*
The Supreme Court has addressed on only afew occasions the extent
to which corporations enjoy those constitutional rights sofundamen-
tal to private citizens. In this article Professor O'Kelley discusses the
inherent difficulty in applying familiar constitutional principles to
corporations and examines those cases in which the Supreme Court
has either extended or denied to corporations various constitutional
rights. Finding that two underlying conceptual doctrines-the Field
rationale and the associational rationale-have guided the Court in
previous decisions in this area, he then applies these doctrines in an
analysis of the recent Supreme Court decision in First National
Bank v. Bellotti. He argues that although the Court reached the
correct result, the reasoning of the various opinions was seriously
flawed. Finally, he applies the two doctrines in an examination of the
constitutionality of the corporate campaign contribution and ex-
penditure limitations of the Federal Election Campaign Act demon-
strating how future cases involving corporate claims of first amend-
ment protection should be analyzed. He concludes that if the statute
is properly construed and the the two doctrines correctly applied, the
limitations on corporate campaign contributions and expenditures
should withstand constitutional challenge.
Judicial consideration of the extent and nature of the constitutional rights
enjoyed by corporations has been sporadic. The United States Supreme Court
has extended certain rights to corporations, but has withheld other rights.
The Court has determined that corporations are entitled to access to the
federal courts.' The Court has also determined that corporations are entitled
to freedom of the press under the first amendment, 2 freedom from unreasona-
ble searches and seizures under the fourth amendment, 3 and to the protection
of the due process 4 and equal protection 5 clauses of the fourteenth amend-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law; B.A. 1970, University of the
South; J.D. 1972, University of Texas at Austin; L.L.M. 1977, Harvard University.
I. See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86, 91 (1809) (term citizen should be
construed to describe real persons who come into court, even under their corporate name).
2. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) (state surtax on newspapers with large
circulation invalidated as restraint on freedom of press).
3. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (subpoena for production of corporate records so broad
that it constituted unreasonable search and seizure in violation of fourth amendment).
4. See Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28, 36 (1889) (although corporations are
persons within meaning of § 1 of fourteenth amendment, state law authorizing doubling of damages when
railroad company refuses to pay actual value of property damaged or destroyed because of railroad's failure
to fence track does not infringe fourteenth amendment).
5. See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886); see notes 36-50 infra and
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ment. The Court, by implication, has also extended to corporations fifth
amendment protection against double jeopardy. 6 Corporations are not citi-
zens within the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause, 7 however,
and they are not entitled to the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 8 Moreover, the Court has determined that the liberty guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment is not characteristic of corporations and
therefore the protection of the fourteenth amendment does not extend to
them.9
Missing from the Court's various decisions involving corporations is any
expressly enunciated common rationale. Many cases appear to involve an ad
hoc determination rather than the development or application of a general
principle. That the development of a constitutional jurisprudence on the
nature of a corporation and its rights has been neglected is not surprising.
Because the modem business corporation was unknown to the framers of the
Constitution, courts addressing the issue of the constitutional rights of
corporations have been forced to make decisions regarding those rights
without recourse to the rich historical sources available when issues relating
to the rights of individuals are being addressed. Additionally, the artificial
nature of a corporation is an inherent source of difficulty in developing an all-
encompassing rationale.
Nowhere is the lack of an agreed rationale for the treatment of corpora-
tions more apparent than in the current debate over the extent of the first
amendment rights of a corporation. In First National Bank v. Bellotti 0 the
Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute prohibiting business corporations
from making contributions or expenditures to influence the vote in connec-
tion with any matter submitted to the voters, unless the matter would
materially affect the property, business, or assets of the corporation.II Federal
legislation, however, prohibits corporations from expending money in con-
nection with federal elections. 12 First National Bank may be read as extending
to corporations the same first amendment rights enjoyed by individuals,
accordingly, corporations may no longer be constitutionally prohibited from
making expenditures in connection with initiatives, referenda, or elections to
federal or state offices. This interpretation of the extent of the constitutional
rights of corporations has been pressed by some commentators, 13 and there
accompanying text.
6. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977) (acquittal of corporation in
accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) unappealable because of double jeopardy
clause).
7. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586-87 (1839) (because corporations are not
citizens within meaning of privileges and immunities clause, one state not required to give extraterritorial
effect to corporate charter granted by another state).
8. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75 (1906) (subpoena for testimony of corporate officer upheld
against claim of corporate fifth amendment privilege).
9. See Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 252, 255 (1906) (state statute forbidding
life insurance companies from using defense that applicant made false or misleading statements on
application, unless matter misrepresented actually contributed to death of insured, does not violate
fourteenth amendment).
10. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
11. Id. at 767-68.
12. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976); notes 171-210 infra and accompanying text.
13. See Clagett & Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo, Its Aftermath, and Its Prospects: The Constitutionality of
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are several lower court decisions that appear to support this view. 14 First
National Bank and other decisions of the Court may also be read to support a
contrary view.
The significance of the final resolution of this matter is not to be
underestimated. Because the framers did not speak for the people on this
issue, the congress should decide the role that the modem business corpora-
tion is to play in the marketplace of ideas. Opinions about the proper scope of
this role may differ. Should General Motors Corporation, for example, be
allowed to spend ten million dollars in 1980 to promote the candidacy of a
presidential aspirant? Should Mobil Oil Corporation be allowed to spend
unlimited sums to purchase advertisements promoting certain political and
social views? Legislative prohibitions of corporate expenditures would be
foreclosed by a Supreme Court determination that the first amendment rights
of corporations are co-extensive with those of individuals.
This article will first explore the inherent difficulty that the artificial nature
of the corporation presents when courts attempt to analyze the constitutional
rights of a corporation. Next it will trace the history of the Supreme Court's
treatment of the corporation to determine a common rationale for this
treatment and the extent to which the Court has successfully grappled with
the inherent difficulty caused by the artificial nature of the corporation. The
article will then examine the First National Bank decision to ascertain what
the Court really said, the extent to which the decision can be viewed as
consistent with the Court's prior decisions, and the extent to which the
decision may be viewed as aberrant. Finally, the article will discuss the
constitutional validity of legislative restrictions on "corporate speech" after
First National Bank.
I. ANALYTIC DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING CORPORATE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Because a corporation is an artificial, legally created entity, the Supreme
Court has had tremendous difficulty determining what rights a corporation
possesses. As the Court stated in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward,15 a corporation exists "only in contemplation of law."' 16 Frederick
Maitland noted, "Into its nostrils the State must breathe the breath of a
GoVernment Restraints on Political Campaign Financing, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1327, 1375 (1976) (pending
dispositive Supreme Court decision, corporations can and should take position that their first amendment
rights are coextensive with outer limits of protection); cf Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal
Ban on Corporate and Union Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 148, 165
(1974) (discussing constitutionality of repealed 18 U.S.C. § 610, which prohibited campaign contributions
or expenditures by national banks, corporations, and labor organizations).
14. See C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 583 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1978) (under First Nat'l Bank
and Buckley, Montana statute forbidding corporations from promoting ballot issue by contributions is
blanket infringement of first amendment and cannot stand); Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844, 852-53 (2d
Cir. 1974) (New York state statute prohibiting corporate contributions for political purposes must be
construed narrowly so that it will not infringe corporate contributors' rights of speech and petition); Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Berkeley, 60 Cal. App. 3d 123, 127, 129, 131 Cal. Rptr. 350, 352, 353 (1976)
(Berkeley city ordinance prohibiting corporations from making contributions to any candidate or
committee abridged corporations' first amendment rights).
15. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
16. Id. at 636.
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fictitious life, for otherwise it would be no animated body but individualistic
dust." 17 This artificiality is a legal fact accepted without question or concern
by the legally trained. Why, then, is the corporation a source of such difficulty
for the courts?
To properly decide a case involving the constitutional rights of a corpora-
tion, a court must avoid the analytic trap that philosopher Gilbert Ryle
described as a "category-mistake." A category-mistake "represents the facts
of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of
types or categories), when they actually belong to another." 8 Ryle then gave
an example of a category-mistake:
A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is
shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums,
scientific departments and administrative offices. He then asks
"But where is the University? I have seen where the members of the
Colleges live, where the Registrar works, where the scientists
experiment and the rest. But I have not yet seen the University in
which reside and work the members of your University." It has
then to be explained to him that the University is not another
collateral institution, some ulterior counterpart to the colleges,
laboratories and offices which he has seen. The University is just
the way in which all that he has already seen is organized. When
they are seen and when their co-ordination is understood, the
University has been seen. His mistake lay in his innocent assump-
tion that it was correct to speak of Christ Church, the Bodleiaon
Library, the Ashmoleon Museum and the University, to speak,
that is, as if "the University" stood for an extra member of the class
of which these other units are members. He was mistakenly
allocating the University to the same category as that to which the
other institutions belong. 19
The corporation as an artificial entity is particularly likely to be the subject
of category-mistake. Let us examine a hypothetical situation in which
corporation ABC holds legal title to Black Acre; ABC's shares are owned by
individuals A, B, and C, and individual D desires to purchase Black Acre.
Upon receiving a deed to Black Acre executed by A, B, and C as individuals,
D demands to receive a deed executed by "the corporation." He is not guilty
of a category-mistake because the corporation is a legal entity and ownership
is a legal concept that treats as fact the difference between a corporation and
those who own its shares. If, upon receiving the re-executed deed showing the
corporation as the grantor with the signatures of A, B, and C affixed to the
document as the representatives of the corporation, D still demands that the
corporation execute the deed, he is guilty of a category-mistake. Signing one's
name is a physical act, which can only be performed by a natural person.
Execution by a corporation is a legal fiction.
As another example, suppose that A, B, and C, the sole shareholders of
ABC Corporation, desire to run a newspaper advertisement to express
17. Maitland, Introduction to 0. GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES at XXX (F.
Maitland trans. 1900).
18. G. RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 16 (1949).
19. Id. at 16-17.
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opposition to a referendum, using ABC Corporation's funds to pay for the
advertisement and lending ABC Corporation's reputation to it. Suppose
further that A, B, and C meet for cocktails and hammer out the desired
advertisement, possibly something as simple as "ABC Corporation urges the
defeat of Proposition Number One." The advertisement is placed in the
newspaper and the next day A receives a call at the corporation's office from a
representative of the sponsors of a debate on the merits of Proposition
Number One, requesting that ABC Corporation participate. If A, B, and C
appear for the program, the sponsors' representative is guilty of a category-
mistake if he expresses disappointment that ABC Corporation could not
attend. Unlike "ownership," "speech" is not a legal concept, but a physical
act. Speech is a human act and is the product of human thought. To believe
that legal entities are capable of physical acts is a category-mistake and any
superstructure erected on this category-mistake may be invalid.
The significance of these examples of category-mistakes for constitutional
analysis should not be overlooked. Not all category-mistakes are as easily
recognized as the above examples, and any legal principle or decision derived
from an assumption that proves to be a category-mistake is likely to be
incorrect.
The current debate about the first amendment rights of corporations
illustrates this problem. In Buckley v. Valeo,20 the Supreme Court held that
expenditures to further expression, such as paying for a political advertise-
ment, are a type of expression akin to speech and thus protected under the
first amendment. 21 Buckley did not consider the rights of corporations. If
corporate expression is equally entitled to this protection, however, the
Federal Election Campaign Act, which bars corporate political expendi-
tures, 22 must be unconstitutional.
The first response to this argument should be that its proponent has made a
category-mistake. Expression is possible only by natural persons, not by
corporations. Only a natural person may express himself through a political
expenditure. Any expenditure of corporate assets for political purposes must
be an expression of the natural persons who authorize and direct the
expenditure.
Although it is necessary to avoid falling into a possible underlying
category-mistake when using catch phrases such as "corporate speech,"
avoiding this logical mistake is only the beginning of the analysis of the nature
and extent of the first amendment rights of corporations. In order to
determine the options open to the Supreme Court in delineating and defining
those rights, this article will turn to an analysis of the Supreme Court's
decisions involving other constitutional rights of corporations. The purpose of
this analysis is to determine if there is a common, as yet unelucidated,
rationale or principle underlying the Court's various decisions, and to
determine if the Court's jurisprudence is free of the category-mistake of
treating corporations as capable of physical acts such as expression.
20. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
21. Id. at 39.
22. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976).
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II. CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. AREAS OTHER THAN THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Immediately after the adoption of the Constitution one might have
rendered a reasonable opinion, based on the document's literal language,
about the constitutional rights of individuals. One could not have rendered
with equal certainty an opinion on the constitutional status of corporations.
Nowhere in the Constitution does the word "corporation" appear. Did the
word "person" include corporations? Did the answer depend on the circum-
stances?
From this point of uncertainty, the Supreme Court, over the ensuing years,
has slowly clarified the constitutional status of the corporation. The initial
problem faced by the Supreme Court was whether the federal courts could
constitutionally take jurisdiction over an action to which a corporation was a
party. In Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 23 the federally chartered bank,
whose officers and directors were citizens of Pennslyvania,24 sued to recover
from citizens of the State of Georgia the value of property seized to satisfy a
state tax.25 The defendants questioned whether a corporation had the power
to sue in federal court because the Court's jurisdiction was limited under the
Constitution "to controversies between citizens of different states." 26 Chief
Justice Marshall noted in a unanimous decision that "both parties must be
citizens, to come within the description" and that a corporation "is certainly
not a citizen."27 Nonetheless, a corporation represented its members who
were citizens and the real parties in interest.28 Therefore, "where the members
of the corporation are. . . citizens of a different state from the opposite party,
[the corporation] come[s] within the spirit and terms of the jurisdiction
conferred by the constitution on the national tribunals. '29
Clearly, Marshall did not fall prey to a category-mistake in his analysis. A
corporation is a legal entity, but it represents the composite interests of real
people who possess legal status as citizens. Citizenship is a legal status given
only to natural persons. The issue, however, was not whether corporations
can be citizens but rather what the framers reasonably meant by using that
term in the clause describing the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Marshall
concluded that the framers must have intended that natural persons choosing
to conduct their business affairs in corporate form should have access to the
federal courts to the same extent as if they had conducted their business in
another form.30 Commendably, Marshall was neither deluded into denying
federal jurisdiction based on the category-mistake that a corporation is
actually, as opposed to legally, something more than its component parts, nor
forced into a category-mistake by holding that a corporation can be a citizen.
23. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
24. Id. at 63.
25. Id. at 62-63.
26. Id. at 86; see U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
27. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 86.
28. Id. at 87.
29. Id. at 88.
30. Id. at 91. Nor, obviously, could this rule be a one-way street. In Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,
5 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 326-27 (1853), the Court confirmed that a corporation not only has access to the
federal courts, but is also subject to suit in the federal court.
[Vol. 67:13471352
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Deveaux established only that corporations have the same right of access to
federal courts as individual citizens. The Court next faced the question
whether a Georgia corporation was a citizen within the meaning of the
privileges and immunities clause and thus constitutionally entitled to contract
in the State of Alabama to the same extent as citizens of Alabama. The Court,
in Bank of Augusta v. Earle,31 concluded that corporations were not citizens
within the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause, which applies
only to natural persons.32 The shareholders of such corporations could
exercise their rights as citizens to contract in Alabama, or they could form an
Alabama corporation to so contract. 33 Moreover, a state could expressly, or
by longstanding comity, acquiesce in a foreign corporation's exercise of the
privileges and immunities granted to its citizens. 34 A state, however, was not
required, in the absence of such consent, to give extraterritorial effect to a
charter granted by another state.35
Not until 1886 was the Supreme Court again required to consider the
extent of the constitutional rights of corporations. In Santa Clara County v.
Southern Pacific Railroad,36 the Court considered the method employed by
the State of California to tax the real property of corporations that operated
railroads in more than one county. Mr. Chief Justice Waite stated:
The Court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether
the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws, applies to these Corporations. We
are all of opinion that it does.37
This disposition of the issue in itself gives no clues to the Court's rationale.
The decision was not made in a vacuum, however, but in the context of the
lower court proceedings in Santa Clara itself and a case that involved
identical issues, County of San Mateo v. Southern Pacific Railroad.38 Both
these cases were heard below by Mr. Justice Field in his capacity as Circuit
Judge. It is not unreasonable to presume that his elaborate and persuasive
opinions in these two cases below reflected the views of his brothers on the
Supreme Court and that these views were then manifested, at least implicitly,
in the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Clara. Justice Field's lower court
decision in Santa Clara,39 although partially reworded, was essentially
identical to his lower court opinion in San Mateo. It is therefore appropriate
to consider both decisions as equal evidence of Justice Field's considered
opinion on the issues presented.
The argument of the defendant railroads in the lower court in both San
Mateo and Santa Clara was that they were denied the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment because California's real
31. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
32. Id. at 586.
33. Id. at 588-89.
34. Id. at 592.
35. Id. at 586, 596.
36. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
37. Id. at 396.
38. 13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), writ of error dismissed per stipulation of counsel, 116 U.S. 138 (1885).
39. 18 F. 385 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883), off d, 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
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property statute required assessment of the whole value of railroad property
owned by railroads operating in more than one county without deduction of
the amount of any mortgages, but allowed all other corporations and persons
a deduction for the amount of mortgages on their property when assessing its
value.40 The railroads also argued that the California statute denied them the
due process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment because they
were denied notice of and a hearing on these assesments, but other corpora-
tions and natural persons were entitled to both notice and a hearing. 41
In both cases Justice Field held that corporations were entitled to equal
protection of the laws and due process of the law to the same extent as
individuals. 42 In San Mateo he explained:
And this. . . [is so] because the property of a corporation is in fact
the property of the corporators. To deprive the corporation of its
property, or to burden it, is, in fact, to deprive the corporators of
their property or to lessen its value. Their interest, undivided
though it be, and constituting only a right during the continuance
of the corporation to participate in its dividends, and on its
dissolution to receive a proportionate share of its assets, has an
appreciable value, and is property in a commercial sense, and
whatever affects the property of the corporation necessarily affects
the commercial value of their interests. If, for example, . . . a
corporation created for banking purposes acquires. . . [property],
no stockholder can claim that he owns any particular item of this
property, but he owns an interest in the whole of it which the
courts will protect against unlawful seizure or appropriation by
others ....
All the guarantees and safeguards of the Constitution for the
protection of property possessed by individuals may, therefore, be
invoked for the protection of the property of corporations. 43
Two questions are raised by the Supreme Court's determination in Santa
Clara that corporations are entitled to equal protection of the laws under the
40. See County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R., 18 F. at 390; County of San Mateo v. Southern
Pac. R.R., 13 F. at 726.
41. See County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R., 18 F. at 409; County of San Mateo v. Southern
Pac. R.R., 13 F. at 726.
42. See County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R., 18 F. at 404; County of San Mateo v. Southern
Pac. R.R., 13 F. at 744.
43. County of San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R.R., 13 F. at 747-48. Justice Field stated his analysis
elegantly in Santa Clara:
Whatever affects the property of the corporation-that is, of all the members united by the
common name-necessarily affects their interests. . . . Whatever confiscates or imposes
burdens on its property, confiscates or imposes burdens on their property, otherwise nobody
would be injured by the proceeding. Whatever advances the prosperity or wealth of the
corporation, advances proportionately the prosperity and business of the corporators,
otherwise no one would be benefited. It is impossible to conceive of a corporation suffering an
injury or reaping a benefit except through its members. The legal entity, the metaphysical
being, that is called a corporation, cannot feel either.
County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R., 18 F. at 403.
1354 [Vol. 67:1347
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fourteenth amendment.44 First, what is the rationale for this decision? Second,
what is the Court's position on extending to corporations due process of law
under the fourteenth amendment?
As to the first question, as already noted, it is reasonable to conclude that
the Court concurred with Justice Field's analysis below in Santa Clara and
San Mateo. As to the second question, it would also be reasonable to conclude
that Justice Waite's announcement was intended to state the Court's position
that both equal protection of the laws and due process of the law were
available to corporations and that the failure to mention due process was an
oversight, because the complaining tax authorities raised both equal protec-
tion and due process claims in the proceedings below.45 Moreover, Justice
Field's lower court decision held that corporations were protected by both the
equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.46
Both of these conclusions are borne out by the Court's opinion, written by
Justice Field, in Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway v. Beckwith.47 Beckwith
involved an action brought by railroad corporations to challenge a state law
on the grounds that it denied corporations equal protection and due process.48
Justice Field agreed that corporations are persons within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment and asserted that "[iut was so held in Santa Clara."4 9
Further, Justice Field's opinion for a unanimous Court in Beckwith confirmed
that the Supreme Court in Santa Clara based its fourteenth amendment
holding on the rationale set forth by the Justice in his lower court decisions in
both San Mateo and Santa Clara. In addition to citing Santa Clara, Justice
Field noted that corporations could invoke the benefits of constitutional
provisions as well as laws that guarantee to persons "the enjoyment of
property, . . . afford to them the means for its protection, or prohibit
legislation injuriously affecting it."50
The lower court opinion in San Mateo also contained the dicta that
corporations "have never been considered citizens for any other purpose than
the protection of the property rights of the corporators." 51 For example, the
"prohibition against the deprivation of life and liberty in the .. . fifth
amendment does not apply to corporations, because . .. the lives and
liberties of the individual corporators are not the life and liberty of the
corporation." 52
The Supreme Court, in effect, adopted this view without discussion in
Northwestern National Life Insurance Co. v. Riggs, 53 a case involving a
constitutional challenge to a Missouri statute that limited the effect of certain
insurance contract clauses. The Court stated that "[e]qually without founda-
tion is the contention that the statute, if enforced, will be inconsistent with the
44. See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
45. See County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R., 18 F. at 390.
46. Id. at 404.
47. 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
48. Id. at 28 (Iowa statute entitled owner of livestock to recover double value for any animals killed or
injured by trains at points where railroad company failed to erect fence).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. County of San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R.R., 13 F. 722, 747 (1882), writ of error dismissed per
stipulation of counsel, 116 U.S. 138 (1885).
52. Id.
53. 203 U.S. 243 (1906).
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liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The liberty referred to in
that Amendment is the liberty of natural, not artificial persons. '54
Justice Harlan, who authored the opinion in Santa Clara, also wrote the
opinion in Riggs. This lends weight to the conclusion that the underlying
rationale of the Supreme Court in Riggs is the same as that set forth by Justice
Field in the lower court opinion in San Mateo.
Thus Justice Field's opinions below in San Mateo and Santa Clara, as
adopted by the Supreme Court in Santa Clara and Beckwith, supply a clear
rationale, which this article will refer to as "the Field rationale," for
measuring the constitutional rights of a business corporation in the protection
of its property: such rights must be coextensive with the rights that its
shareholders would enjoy if they had chosen to conduct their business in an
unincorporated form. This rationale fully justifies Marshall's decision in
Deveaux that a corporation may sue for damages in federal court to the same
extent as an individual. The rationale also avoids the category-mistake of
assuming that a business corporation is something other than the legal form
chosen by individuals to operate a business.
Furthermore, the Field rationale developed in San Mateo, as implicitly
adopted in Riggs, clearly recognizes that only natural persons can assert
natural liberties, as opposed to rights necessary to protect property. This
position is free of category-mistake and emphasizes again the Court's
realization that a business corporation is merely a vehicle to facilitate the
conduct of business by and for natural persons; a corporation is not itself a
natural person and does not possess the attributes of a natural person.
After Riggs the Court considered the applicability to a corporation of the
fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
and the fifth amendment's privilege against compelled self-incrimination. In
Hale v. Henkel55 a corporate officer refused to testify before a grand jury
investigating the corporation and further refused to honor a subpoena duces
tecum requiring him to produce corporate records in his possession to aid the
investigation of his corporation.5 6 As to Hale's refusal to testify, the Court
held that the privilege against self-incrimination is purely personal. Hale
could not invoke the privilege of any third person, including any privilege of
his corporation, based on a concern that his testimony might incriminate that
third person.57
In considering Hale's right to the fifth amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination for the oral testimony sought, the Court noted that this
question could never arise for a corporation:
The question whether a corporation is a "person" within the
meaning of this Amendment really does not arise, except perhaps
where a corporation is called upon to answer a bill of discovery,
since it can only be heard by oral evidence in the person of some one
of its agents or employes.58
54. Id. at 255.
55. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
56. Id. at 46.
57. Id. at 69-70.
58. Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
1356 [Vol. 67:1347
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In effect, the Henkel Court was saying that because oral communication is an
act peculiar to natural persons, it is physically impossible for a corporation to
give oral evidence. It would therefore be a category-mistake to extend to
corporations the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination by oral
communication. Hale, of course, could assert the privilege against self-
incrimination personally to the extent not obviated by a grant of immunity.59
The Court then discussed Hale's refusal to produce corporate documents in
his possession. The Court first noted that it is an established principle that
requiring the production of a person's own private papers to connect him with
a crime violates the fifth amendment's prohibition against compelling a
person to be a witness against himself.60 A corporation could also have books
and records that might connect it to a crime, and those records would
necessarily be in the possession of its officers. Hale therefore argued that the
corporation's privilege against self-incrimination would be violated if he
produced the documents.61
The Court, however, refused to accept Hale's argument. Instead, it
reasoned that a corporation is a creature of the state with a right to continued
existence only in accordance with the laws of that state. Because of the
artificial nature of a corporation, much of the evidence of its misconduct
might be discoverable only from an examination of its books and records. The
state and federal government, therefore, must have a reserved visitorial right
to inspect the books and records of a corporation. Consequently, a corpora-
tion has no fifth amendment protection against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion.62
This analysis seems unnecessarily artificial in liglt of the Field rationale,
which underlies the previous decisions of the Court. Perhaps the Court fell
prey to a category-mistake and treated a corporation as capable of producing
books and records. To properly analyze the corporation's rights, production,
which is a physical act, must be contrasted with ownership, which is a legal
right. Individuals may both own and produce books and records, but
corporations may only own them. As the Court subsequently stated in Wilson
v. United States,63 a case involving similar issues, the privilege against self-
incrimination prevents compulsory production only of personal items in one's
possession.64 The Court need have said no more in connection with produc-
tion of documents than it did in connection with oral testimony. The question
of fifth amendment protection for a corporation cannot arise in this context
because a corporation is incapable of production.
Thus, the holding in Hale v. Henkel clearly can be supported under the
Field rationale. Because of its artificial nature a corporation convicted of a
crime cannot be imprisoned, but must be punished by a monetary extraction.
Denying fifth amendment protection to a corporation does not, however,
disadvantage those who choose to conduct their businesses in corporate form
vis-a-vis those who do not choose to incorporate. In either case the privilege
extends only to the person in possession of the records, and only to the extent
59. Id. at 67, 69.
60. Id. at 71.
61. Id. at 74.
62. Id. at 74-75.
63. 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
64. Id. at 378.
1979] 1357
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
the records are personal. A partner or agent possessing records of an
unincorporated business would be in exactly the same position as an officer
possessing records of a corporation. A subpoena duces tecum directed at
business records would have to be honored except to the extent the records
were within that individual's personal privilege against self-incrimination. 6S
The Henkel Court, however, further stated in dictum, later adopted in
Wilson,66 that corporations are entitled to protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures under the fourth amendment. This opinion was clearly
based on the Field rationale. The Court stated:
A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under
an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing
itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities
appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be taken without
compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of
law, and is protected, under the Fourteenth Amendment, against
unlawful discrimination. 67
In summary, the reasoning in Henkel on the fourth amendment issue and
its decision on the fifth amendment issue are both consistent with the Field
rationale. The emphasis on the state's reserved right of visitation to justify
denial of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination can be
viewed as the possible result of a category-mistake. Although it is an
unfortunate choice of grounds for those in search of purity of rationale, it does
not undercut the Field rationale.
The Supreme Court has apparently also held that corporations are
protected by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. 68 This status
is apparent, rather than express, because the Court has decided the applica-
bility of the double jeopardy clause in cases in which a corporation was a
defendant, without expressly stating that it was extending the protection of
the double jeopardy clause to a corporation. 69 No opinion, therefore, sets
forth a rationale for the extension to corporations of the protection against
double jeopardy.70
65. This result, however, may not be defensible in a case in which a corporation's sole shareholder is
given immunity and required to testify against his corporation. The testimony could possibly result in a
criminal penalty being assessed against the corporation, or if the shareholder refuses to testify, a judgment
of contempt against him. This tactic could not be employed against a sole proprietor. In such limited cases
it would seem to be a category-mistake to treat the corporation as more than its shareholder, and, therefore,
incorrect to deny the corporation fifth amendment protection.
66. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 376, 384 (1911) (corporate officer holding company's
books subject to corporate duty cannot claim privilege against self-incrimination to prevent production of
books even if implicated in corporation's illegal conduct).
67. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (emphasis added) (no unreasonable search and seizure when
search warrant specifically and properly limited demands for production of corporate documents).
68. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1977) (double jeopardy clause
prevents appeal of acquittal of corporation pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c)).
69. Compare id. and Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam) (double jeopardy
clause prevents appeal of acquittal of corporation and employees ordered by court before close of
prosecution's case) with Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 151 (1956) (double jeopardy clause
does not apply to action against corporation involving civil sanction) and American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 781, 788 (1946) (double jeopardy clause does not apply to prosecution of corporation and
officers for two independent offenses under same statute).
70. The Supreme Court has recently denied certiorari in a case that carefully presented the rationale for
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After this survey of the Supreme Court's decisions governing the constitu-
tional rights of corporations in other than the first amendment area it is fair to
conclude that a consistent rationale does underlie these decisions, although
the rationale of the Court is not set forth clearly in most cases or at all in
others. The Court has consistently extended to corporations the same
constitutional rights in defense of the corporation's business and property that
would have been available to an unincorporated individual. This result should
not differ, moreover, if the business is conducted as a nonprofit corporation.
At the same time the Court has not made the category-mistake of treating
corporations as capable of physical acts or having physical attributes. This
article now turns to the conceptually more difficult area of the first
amendment.
B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In analyzing the Supreme Court decisions on the first amendment rights of
corporations, we must consider what rationale underlies the decisions and
whether it is consistent with the Court's analysis in other areas and, therefore,
free from category-mistake. In this endeavor it is useful first to consider cases
involving corporations wishing to assert first amendment rights to protect
expression that is a part of their business. Then it is useful to consider cases
involving corporations wishing to assert first amendment rights in other
contexts.
In Grosjean v. American Press Co.,71 nine corporations sought an injunction
against enforcement of an act authorizing the State of Louisiana to impose a
license tax in an amount equal to two percent of the gross receipts of
newspapers having a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week. Failure
to report or pay the tax was punishable as a misdemeanor. 72 The Court's
primary inquiry was whether this tax was an abridgment of freedom of the
press and therefore invalid under the first amendment as made applicable to
the states by the fourteenth amendment. Reconstructing the historical setting
within which the first amendment was conceived, the Court observed that one
of the concerns of the framers was prior censorship. The act of the English
Parliament providing for prior censorship expired by its terms in 1695, and
the framers intended the first amendment to prevent its resurrection in this
country. The framers were also aware that the press in England was still
subject to restraint through the so-called "taxes on knowlege," which were
intended to curtail circulation. Indeed, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
extending to corporations the protection of the double jeopardy clause. See United States v. Security Nat'l
Bank, 430 U.S. 950 (1977). In Security Nat'l Bank a judgment of acquittal had been entered in an action
against a corporation for illegal campaign contributions, and the Government appealed. See United States
v. Security National Bank, 546 F.2d 492 (1976). The corporation asserted the protection of the double
jeopardy clause, but the Government countered that corporations could not claim the protection afforded
by that clause. The court of appeals first noted that the double jeopardy clause is clearly available in cases
in which only monetary penalties, and not any danger to life and limb, are involved. Id at 493. Then it
reasoned that it is the "shareholders who in the end must bear the financial burden consequent upon
criminal liability." Id. at 494. Moreover, "No corporation, large or small, can escape the 'incalculable
effect' which a conviction may have on the public attitude toward the company. ... Id. This analysis is
without doubt the same one that Field set forth in both San Mateo and Santa Clara.
71. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
72. Id. at 240-41.
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had instituted a stamp tax on newspapers and magazines in 1785 and an
advertisement tax in 1786, both of which were violently opposed and quickly
repealed. In light of this historical background the Supreme Court ruled that
the Louisiana newspaper tax constituted an abridgement of freedom of the
press that the framers intended to prevent by adoption of the first amend-
ment.73
The Court also considered whether the complaining corporations, whose
business was newspaper publication, could avail themselves of the freedom of
the press guaranteed by the first amendment to the same extent as a natural
person publishing a similarly affected newspaper. 74 The Field rationale
requires that corporations be allowed to assert the constitutional rights
necessary to protect their business to the same extent as if they were
unincorporated. Nothing could be more essential to the business of newspa-
pers than freedom of the press. This need is especially obvious when the
abridgment, as in Grosjean, involves a discriminatory tax on the revenues of
certain newspapers. Such an abridgment represents an imminent danger to
the continued existence of the business. Therefore, under the Field rationale, a
corporation whose business includes publishing a newspaper must be able to
assert first amendment rights of freedom of speech and press to protect its
business.
Although this result suggests that a corporation is capable of speech, it
does not involve any category-mistake. The corporation cannot speak, but its
business requires individual speech and a corporation may be held legally
responsible for the speech of its agents. Therefore, it is entitled to protection
under the Field rationale.
The Court in Grosjean stated that corporations are entitled to the first
amendment protection of freedom of the press, but presented no express
rationale for its decision. The Court, however, cited one case for the
proposition that corporations are not citizens within the meaning of the
privileges and immunities clause;75 that proposition is consistent with the
Field rationale.76 The Court also cited two cases for the proposition that
corporations are protected by the equal protection and due process clauses of
the fourteenth amendment.77 Both cases cite the Supreme Court's decision in
Santa Clara as support for this proposition,78 and both cited opinions were
written by Justice Harlan, the author of the the Supreme Court's Santa Clara
opinion. In addition, one of these cases79 cites Justice Field's opinion in
73. Id. at 245-51.
74. Id. at 244.
75. Id. at 244 (citing Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868)).
76. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 178-79, 181-85 (1868) (because corporation has no legal
existence outside state where created, other states may recognize it on whatever terms they think proper;
therefore, Virginia law requiring out-of-state insurance companies to post bond before carrying on business
within state is constitutional). Paul follows the holding in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519
(1839). The determination that the privileges and immunities clause does not apply to corporations is
consistent with the Field rationale and free of category-mistake. See notes 31-35 supra and accompanying
text (discussing Bank of Augusta v. Earle).
77. 297 U.S. at 244 (citing Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522 (1897); Covington & L. Turnpike Rd. Co.
v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896) (state statute compelling turnpike company to reduce rates so far
that it cannot repair road or earn any dividends for shareholders deprives company of due process)).
78. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522 (1897); Covington & L. Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164
U.S. 578, 592 (1896).
79. See Covington & L. Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896).
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Minneapolis & Saint Louis Railway v. Beckwith,80 which evidenced the
Supreme Court's adoption of the Field rationale.81
That the cited cases were based on the Field rationale is not conclusive
evidence that the Court used that rationale in Grosjean. Nonetheless, it is all
the evidence available. Because the rationale fits the facts of the case, avoids
category-mistake, and explains that the corporation can obtain first amend-
ment protection for expressions by others that are a part of its business, it is
fair to conclude that Grosjean constituted another case based on the Field
rationale.
In the years after its decision in Grosjean, the Supreme Court has decided
many cases involving the first amendment rights of a corporation whose
business involved a form of expression that allegedly was protected by the
first amendment and was being unconstitutionally abridged. Only one
dissenting opinion mentions that it is the corporation that is asserting the
rights.82 Obviously, the Court has felt that this factor warranted no discus-
sion. Nor should this attitude be surprising when one analyzes these decisions
in the context of the Field rationale.
A typical case, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,83 involved a corporation
engaged in the business of distributing motion pictures. The corporation
challenged a New York statute permitting the banning of sacrilegious motion
picture films and attaching criminal penalties to the exhibition of a film so
banned.84 The Supreme Court determined that motion pictures were a form of
expression safeguarded by the first amendment and therefore held the statute
invalid.85 There was no discussion of why a corporation could assert first
amendment rights. Other cases involving the first amendment rights of a
corporation whose business involved a form of expression had similar fact
patterns.86
The Field rationale clearly justifies the result in these cases. Applying this
rationale, the court first must determine whether a natural person conducting
the business would be able to assert the protection of the first amendment.
This determination entails a preliminary determination of whether the form
of expression is either "speech" or "press" within the meaning of the first
amendment. Obviously, this inquiry causes no difficulty when the business
involved is, as in Grosjean, publishing a newspaper. Many of the cases after
Grosjean, such as Joseph Burstyn, however, have not involved such clearly
covered forms of expression. Thus, the primary focus of these cases has been
on the nature of the expression. If it is determined that the expression is of the
type entitled to protection, then the court must decide whether the statute or
80. 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
81. See notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
82. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 280-81 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
83. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
84. Id. at 497-99.
85. Id. at 502, 506.
86. See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 933-34 (1975) (first and fourteenth amendments
prohibit enforcement against corporation running topless bar of overbroad local ordinance prohibiting
topless entertainment); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (first and
fourteenth amendments prohibit enforcement against corporate publisher of state "right of reply" statute);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (first and fourteenth amendments prevent
damage award in civil libel action by public official against newspaper corporation for publishing
advertisement critical of public official when no actual malice shown).
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action abridges expression in a manner prohibited by the first amendment.
Furthermore, under the Field rationale the court does not need to deal with
the corporate status of a party asserting first amendment rights, as long as the
corporation asserts the rights in connection with a form of expression that is a
part of the corporation's business.
Up to this point the Court successfully dealt with the dilemma presented by
a corporation. If a constitutional right to protect property or business would
be available to a natural person, then, under the Field rationale, the Court has
consistently held that the right is equally available to a corporation for the
protection of its property. Critical to the validity of the treatment afforded
corporations under the Field rationale is that the rationale is not based on a
category-mistake: a corporation can properly be considered the owner of
property or business. In cases in which a corporation asserted a constitutional
right that by its terms and intent could be asserted only if a corporation were
deemed to be a natural person or capable of physical acts, the Court has
avoided a category-mistake and denied the corporation that constitutional
right.
If the Court were faced with an assertion of first amendment rights by a
corporation to protect expression that was not a part of the corporation's
business, the Field rationale would be inapplicable. The first amendment
could be asserted by the corporation only if the corporation could properly be
treated as being capable of the physical act of speech or expression. Should it
not then follow that a corporation could not be extended first amendment
rights for expression not a part of business?
The Court faced this question in Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organizations.8 7 The original action was brought by certain individuals,
unincorporated labor unions, and the American Civil Liberties Union, a
membership corporation.88 The plaintiffs asked that certain city ordinances be
declared unconstitutional and void on the grounds that they deprived the
plaintiffs of the privileges of free speech and peaceable assembly guaranteed to
them as citizens of the United States by the first amendment made applicable
to the states by the fourteenth amendment.8 9
The Supreme Court held that only natural persons, not corporations or
unincorporated associations, could assert these first amendment rights. The
Court was divided on the governing rationale. Justice Roberts reached the
result by first noting that only citizens have freedom of speech and assembly. 90
Because only natural persons can be citizens, natural persons alone "are
entitled to the privileges and immunities which section 1 of the fourteenth
amendment secures for 'citizens of the United States.' "91 Justice Stone
reached the same result as Justice Roberts, but used a different analysis. He
maintained that first amendment rights were not restricted to citizens, but
extended to all persons under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 92 In his discussion of the corporate plaintiff, Justice Stone, citing
for support the holding in the Riggs case, stated, "[as] to the American Civil
87. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
88. Id. at 500-01.
89. Id. at 503.
90. Id. at 513. Justice Roberts was joined only by Justice Black and Chief Justice Hughes on this issue.
Id. at 500, 532.
91. Id. at 514.
92. Id. at 519. Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Reed. Id. at 500.
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Liberties Union, which is a corporation, it cannot be said to be deprived of the
civil rights of freedom of speech and of assembly, for the liberty guaranteed by
the due process clause is the liberty of natural, not artificial persons. '93
The result in Hague is consistent with the Court's precedent and free of
category-mistake because it does not treat a corporation as capable of the
physical act of speech. It is not necessarily clear, however, that a corporation
should be extended first amendment rights only when the expression to be
protected is a part of its business. Nor is it clear that the denial of first
amendment rights to a corporation for expression that is not a part of its
business would always be free of category-mistake.
The proper analysis must examine the factual context and the realities
involved to arrive at the correct result. To take the simplest example, a
nonprofit corporation formed by a single natural person as a vehicle for the
expression of his ideas is in reality no more than that individual. Any ideas
expressed through such a corporation are those of that individual, although
the corporation may, through gifts of others, obtain assets that are used to
amplify the individual's expression. The relationship between the individual
and the corporation remains the same even if the individual uses as his vehicle
a for-profit corporation.
The key consideration, therefore, is the identity between the member or
shareholder and the person who is actually expressing himself. Whether or
not the corporation exists, it is the individual's views that are being expressed.
In such a situation it is not a category-mistake to say that the corporation is
merely the medium of expression for its owner. Can there be any doubt that in
such a case the corporation should be able to assert first amendment rights to
protect the ideas expressed through it?
The answer should be different for a large corporation whose shareholders
and representatives have no community of views. If, for instance, Mobil Oil
Corporation pays for an advertisement that expresses certain social views, the
expression involved is not that of the myriad shareholders, but of the top
management of Mobil. The reality of this situation does not by itself mandate
that Mobil be treated as if it were capable of expression.
The Supreme Court was not presented with a clear-cut issue of the first
amendment rights of a one-member nonprofit advocacy corporation or a one-
shareholder for-profit corporation. Instead, it was forced to grapple with two
cases arising out of the civil rights struggle and involving a multimember
nonprofit advocacy corporation, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson94 and
NAACP v. Button.95
In Patterson the Court reviewed a civil contempt judgment entered by an
Alabama state court against the NAACP. The state had sought to exclude the
organization, a nonprofit membership corporation organized under the laws
of New York, from Alabama for failure to qualify to do business as a foreign
corporation. Alabama sought the production of numerous items in its attempt
to prove that the NAACP had conducted sufficient intrastate activities to
require this qualification. The state court ordered the NAACP to produce
93. Id. at 510 (citing Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906)); see notes 53-
54 supra and accompanying text.
94. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
95. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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these items, including its membership lists. When the organization refused to
produce its membership lists, the court entered a judgment of contempt. 96
The NAACP maintained that Alabama could not constitutionally require
production of the membership list because production would violate the
members' right to freedom of association guaranteed by the first amend-
ment.97 The Court first had to determine whether the NAACP could assert
this right on behalf of its members. The Court noted that if the members
themselves were required to assert the right it would become meaningless; in
the act of asserting their rights, they would be revealing their identity. In
order to preserve the first amendment right of freedom of association, the
corporation had to be allowed to assert the rights on behalf of its members. 98
The Court further justified its result by stressing the nexus between the
corporation and its members.
Petitioner is the appropriate party to assert these rights, because it
and its members are in every practical sense identical. The
Association, which provides in its constitution that "[a]ny person
who is in accordance with [its] principles and policies. . ." may
become a member, is but the medium through which its individual
members seek to make more effective the expression of their own
views. 99
The Court concluded that disclosure of the membership list would abridge the
members' right to free association and reversed the Alabama Supreme Court's
denial of the NAACP's motion to vacate the contempt judgment.100
The Court in Patterson treated the NAACP in the manner suggested in the
example above for a one-member nonprofit advocacy corporation. The
NAACP's membership was limited to those holding and desiring to express
the same views.101 Expression by the NAACP was expression that all the
members wished to make. The decision, based on the realities involved,
coincides with the principle that individuals should be entitled to exercise the
same first amendment rights whether within the structure of a corporation or
as an unincorporated association. Although the Court in Patterson recognized
the corporation's role as a medium for the expression of the views of its
members, 0 2 it did not reach the question whether a corporation should be
able to protect this right of expression on its own behalf.
In NAACP v. Button103 the Court faced the issue whether the NAACP
could assert first amendment rights not only on behalf of its members, but
also on behalf of itself. In Button the NAACP brought suit to restrain
enforcement of a Virginia criminal statute banning improper solicitation of
legal or professional business, which had been construed by the Virginia
Supreme Court to apply to the activities of the NAACP. 104 The NAACP had
96. NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. at 451-54.
97. Id. at 460.
98. Id. at 458-60.
99. Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 454, 461-62, 467.
101. The Constitution of the NAACP provided for acceptance as a member of" '[a]ny person who is in
accordance with [its] principles and policies.' " Id. at 459.
102. Id.
103. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
104. Id. at 417-19, 423-26.
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been engaged in litigation aimed at ending racial segregation in the public
schools of the Commonwealth.105 NAACP staff attorneys had been acquaint-
ing interested listeners with the legal steps necessary to achieve desegregation
and using printed forms to obtain from such persons authorization for the
NAACP, or others, to represent them in legal proceedings to achieve
desegregation. 106 These activities were held by the Virginia Supreme Court to
be "solicitation" of the type criminally proscribed by the statute.107
The NAACP challenged the statute on the ground that it infringed the first
amendment rights of the NAACP and its members and lawyers to freedom of
association and expression. 108 As in Patterson, the NAACP attempted to
assert the first amendment rights of its members. Again the Court found the
NAACP to be a proper party to assert those rights for its members. 109 The
Court further held that the NAACP was entitled to assert first amendment
rights of association and expression "on its own behalf, because, though a
corporation, it is directly engaged in those activities, claimed to be constitu-
tionally protected, which the statute would curtail." 110
The Court concluded that the solicitation engaged in by the staff of the
NAACP was a form of association and expression entitled to protection
under the first amendment, "' and that the statute unduly inhibited those first
amendment rights. 112 The state's interest in regulating the legal profession did
not in these circumstances provide a compelling state interest justifying the
abridgment of first amendment rights. 113 NAACP activity presented no
danger of malicious litigation or unethical pecuniary gain.114 Nor was there
any risk of conflict of interest because "the aims and interests of [the]
NAACP have not been shown to conflict with those of its members and
nonmember Negro litigants." 115 Indeed, as noted in Patterson, NAACP
members must subscribe to the organization's principles and policies. 16 The
state failed to show any "substantive evils flowing from [NAACP] activities"
that could justify Virginia's broad statutory prohibitions." 7
As in Patterson, the Court in Button recognized that when a group of
individuals shares unanimity of interest and desires to express their common
views, those individuals may exercise their freedom of expression through the
medium of a corporation, through other representatives, or through both. The
Court in Button further held that any corporation so utilized could assert first
amendment rights available to its members as natural persons, not only on
behalf of those members, but also for itself as their instrument. The Court's
rationale will be referred to hereafter as the "associational rationale."
By adopting the associational rationale, the Court avoided the category-
mistake trap that its decision in Northwestern National Life Insurance Co. v.
105. Id. at 419-20.
106. Id. at 421.
107. Id. at 425.
108. Id. at 428.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 428-29.
112. Id. at 437.
113. Id. at 438.
114. Id. at 440-42.
115. Id. at 443.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 444.
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Riggs"8 had created. It is true that life and liberty are attributes that only
natural persons can possess. In the abstract, the Riggs holding that the liberty
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment is that of natural persons seems free
of category-mistake. After Riggs, however, the Supreme Court began to fill
the due process clause with specific liberties guaranteed by other amend-
ments. In Gitlow v. New York, 119 the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment was assumed to encompass the safeguards of the first amend-
ment. 120 As the "liberty" protected by the fourteenth amendment grew in
scope, it was inevitable that the Court would be required to rethink its Riggs
holding in various concrete situations. The associational rationale alleviates
the category-mistake inherent in the Riggs decision. Indeed, it is possible that
in the Hague case,121 which appears to have relied on Riggs, the ACLU should
have been allowed to assert first amendment rights if its members possessed
the requisite identity of views and desire to express them to bring the ACLU's
conduct within the associational rationale. 22
The adjustment in the prior rationale accomplished by the Button case
would appear to have left the Supreme Court with a consistent body of
precedent. Under the Field rationale a corporation would have the same
constitutional rights to protect its business as would its shareholders if they
conducted that business as an unincorporated association. A corporation
cannot assert a constitutional right that by its nature can be available only to
natural persons or applicable only to the acts of natural persons. Under the
associational rationale, however, when individuals with a desire to express
their common views exercise their freedom of expression through the medium
of a corporation and its agents, the corporation may assert that the expression
is protected under the first amendment.
Although the proper answer seems clear under the Court's prior decisions
and rationale, the Court had not yet answered the next logical question
concerning the first amendment rights of corporations: What are the corpora-
tion's rights of freedom of expression when the expression involved is not a
part of the business of the corporation and does not represent the commonly
held views of its members or shareholders? It is this question that the Court
first addressed in First National Bank v. Bellotti.123
III. First National Bank v. Bellotti
In 1976 the Massachusetts General Court proposed to the people of the
state a constitutional amendment permitting the legislature to impose a
graduated tax on the income of individuals. 24 Banking and business corpora-
tions claimed that institution of a graduated tax on the income of individuals
would damage their business. Consequently, the corporations wished to spend
118. 203 U.S. 243 (1906); see notes 53-54 supra and accompanying text.
119. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
120. Id. at 666.
121. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
122. See note 93 supra and accompanying text (discussing Riggs).
123. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
124. See First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen., 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (Mass. 1977), rev'd sub nora. First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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money to publicize by newspaper advertisements and similar methods their
opposition to the proposed amendment.1 25
A state statute appeared to prohibit their expenditures. The statute
prohibited a corporation incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts or
doing business in the state of Massachusetts from giving or expending
anything of value
for the purpose of aiding, promoting or preventing the nomination
or election of any person to public office, or aiding, promoting or
antagonizing the interests of any political party, or influencing or
affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other
than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets
of the corporation. 26
The statute further created the irrebuttable evidentiary presumption that
"[n]o question submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of the
income, property or transactions of individuals shall be deemed materially to
affect the property, business or assets of the corporation."'' 2 7 The statute
contained no similar prohibition against expenditures by natural persons
conducting similar businesses. 28
Under threat of prosecution, two banking corporations and three business
corporations brought a declaratory judgment proceeding to have the statute
declared unconstitutional.12 9 The plaintiff corporation maintained that be-
cause the U.S. Supreme Court had established that expenditures furthering
expression are akin to speech,130 the statute violated their rights under the first
amendment and denied them equal protection of the laws.131 The Supreme
Judicial Court for the County of Suffolk upheld the validity of the statute. 32
On direct appeal the United States Supreme Court, in a five to four
decision, held that the statute was an unconstitutional abridgment of speech
protected under the first amendment 33 The Court did not discuss other
claimed deficiencies in the statute. To properly analyze the Court's opinion, it
is first necessary to look at the First National Bank case within the historical
and conceptual framework that supports the Court's prior decisions involving
the constitutional rights of corporations.
Under the Field rationale a corporation has the same constitutional rights
in connection with its business as its shareholders would if they were to
conduct the business as an unincorporated association. Accordingly, corpora-
tions are entitled to equal protection of the law and should, therefore, be
treated no differently in connection with their business than similarly situated
125. Id. at 1265-66.
126. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1979).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen., 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (Mass. 1977), rev'd sub noma. First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
130. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) (Federal Election Campaign Act
expenditure and contribution limits operate in area of political expression, the most fundamental first
amendment activity).
131. First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen., 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1275 (Mass. 1977), rev'd sub nom. First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
132. Id. at 1273, 1275, 1276.
133. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978).
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entities. If Massachusetts had attempted by statute to prohibit a corporation
from making expenditures for supplies needed in its business, but had placed
no similar restrictions on expenditures by natural persons conducting a
similar business, the statute would unquestionably violate the equal protec-
tion clause.
At first blush it appears that the Massachusetts statute challenged in First
National Bank is invalid on the same grounds. Analysis, however, does not
support the applicability of the equal protection clause. The statute is not
aimed at an expenditure as a mere disbursement of corporate assets. Rather, it
is aimed at the expenditure as expression. It is not a category-mistake to speak
of a corporation as being capable of making expenditures to purchase
supplies. A corporation has the legal right and power to do so. It is, however,
a category-mistake to speak of a corporation as being capable of expression.
Expression can be made only by natural persons. Because it is incapable of
expression, a corporation, as a corporation, cannot possibly claim a denial of
equal protection of the laws when it is prohibited from making expenditures
for the purpose of promoting expression. Consideration of the First National
Bank decision must therefore focus not on the corporation's right to equal
protection, but rather on first amendment rights.
The Court has generally refused to extend to corporations a constitutional
right that is by its nature applicable only to natural persons or their acts.
Under this general principle, first amendment rights may not be asserted by
corporations because corporations are incapable of expression. The Court's
holdings, however, reveal exceptions to this general rule when application of
the rule would not result in category-mistake.
As discussed above, when a corporation's business is, or includes, the
marketing of expression, it may assert first amendment rights under the Field
rationale to protect that expression and, therefore, its business.134 In such
cases, the corporation need not claim that the expression is that of the
corporation, but only that it is a component part of the corporation's business.
The prohibition challenged in these cases was aimed at the expression itself
regardless of the source. The Massachusetts statute, in contrast, is not aimed
at the expression itself because natural persons may make such expenditures.
Rather, it is aimed at the source of "expression."1 35 Moreover, the "expres-
sion" prohibited by the Massachusetts statute is neither a product of nor
marketed by a corporation. Accordingly, the Field rationale exception to the
general rule is inapplicable.
Presumably corporate management desires, at least in part, to make the
prohibited expenditues to protect or benefit the corporation. If the first
amendment affords greater protection to a natural person whose expression is
motivated by a desire to protect his business than it affords to a person whose
expression is motivated by other concerns, the Field rationale would arguably
apply when such corporate expenditures were made. When the question is
framed in this manner, it seems clear that the Supreme Court would extend
no greater protection to the speech or expenditures of an individual desiring
to protect his business than to the speech or expenditures of an individual
134. See notes 71-86 supra and accompanying text.
135. Expenditures by natural persons that are intended to further expression are treated as a form of
expression. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) (campaign expenditure and
contribution limits regulate political expression).
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motivated by other concerns. For example, an individual who owned and
operated a business that manufactured high quality glass drink bottles might
wish to make expenditures to support a proposed referendum to ban
nonreturnable bottles, feeling that such a ban would increase his business.
Another individual might wish to make expenditures to support the same
referendum because of ecological concerns. Surely the Court would extend no
greater right of expression to the first individual.
Consideration of the societal values protected by freedom of expression
supports this conclusion. The values so protected are commonly thought to
be: (1) Self-fulfillment; (2) truth; (3) citizen participation in social and
political decision-making; and (4) maintenance of a balance between stability
and change in society. 136 Protection of these values is not enhanced by giving
to an individual a greater right to express himself because he is motivated by
business interests.
An individual thus has no greater right to express himself simply because
he is motivated by business interests. The proposition can be restated as
follows: An individual has no first amendment rights by virtue of the fact that
his expression is motivated by his business interests. Accordingly, under the
Field rationale, a corporation is extended no first amendment rights to make
expenditures for the purpose of furthering expression by virtue of the fact that
the expression is motivated by its business interests.
Our analysis must also take into account the associational rationale. Under
that rationale, when individuals choose to express their common views
through the medium of a corporation and its agents, the corporation may
assert the protection of the first amendment to the same extent as could its
members or shareholders were they an unincorporated association. The key
to this rationale is the realization that expression can be the product or act
only of natural persons. When the shareholders and the natural persons who
are the agents of the corporation have a unanimity of view, a political
expenditure by the corporation is simply the expression of the shareholders
through the medium of the corporation. Accordingly, the corporation should
be able to protect its effectiveness as a medium by asserting the same first
amendment rights as its shareholders could have asserted as an unincor-
porated body. The clearest example of the correctness of this principle is a
corporation sole whose shareholder causes the corporation to make an
expenditure to pay for a newspaper advertisement setting forth his own views.
The expression represented by the expenditure, as well as the expression made
possible by the expenditure, is that of the individual shareholder regardless of
the fact that he has used assets of the corporation.
One need look no further than this example to see that the Massachusetts
statute considered in First National Bank is void on its face because it is
overbroad in its coverage. The Massachusetts statute places a total ban on
corporate expenditures. The expenditures of a corporation sole are included
within the statute's embrace. Under the associational rationale, however, such
a corporation is entitled to first amendment protection to the same extent as
its shareholder, a natural person acting as an individual. Unless a total ban on
expenditures or contributions by a natural person for the purpose of
influencing a referendum can withstand first amendment scrutiny, the
Massachusetts statute cannot stand. A total ban on individuals' expenditures
136. See T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (1963).
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or contributions concerning ballot issues would no doubt succumb to a first
amendment challenge.137 The Massachusetts statute is, therefore, overinclu-
sive and void on its face because it infringes on the rights of a corporation
sole.138 No further inquiry or analysis by the Court was necessary.
The Court, with Justice Powell speaking for the majority, did reach the
result suggested by the above analysis. In invalidating the Massachusetts
statute for unconstitutionally abridging freedom of speech the Court was
unable to set forth a satisfactory framework for its decision, either in light of
precedent or with a view to future cases certain to arise. It is only a slight
exaggeration to say that Justice Powell reached the right result for the wrong
reason and that Justice White's dissent, which was joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, urged the wrong result but more nearly grasped the correct
governing rationale. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, was the only Justice to
recognize the importance and true meaning of the cases underlying the Field
rationale, but he ignored the cases underlying the associational rationale.
Clearly, the Court was a house divided, grasping at parts of the correct
rationale, but unable to unite the pieces into one conceptually solid whole.
Justice Powell began his opinion with an acknowledgment that the issue
presented was one of first impression. 39 His phrasing of the issue, unfortu-
nately, obscured the basic problem presented by the case: "The proper
question. . . is not whether corporations 'have' First Amendment rights and,
if so, whether they are coextensive with those of natural person. Instead, the
question must be whether. . .[the statute] abridges expression that the First
Amendment was meant to protect."1 40 Obviously the Court was required to
determine whether the Massachusetts statute abridges expression that the
first amendment was meant to protect. Inherent in this determination,
however, is a further determination of the first amendment rights of
corporations.
Even more troublesome than his phrasing of the issue is Justice Powell's
failure to note that what the statute seeks to prohibit is the expression, if any,
to be found in a corporate expenditure. For example, after noting that the
protection of political expression was a major reason for adopting the first
amendment and that political speech is indispensable in a democracy, Justice
Powell stated, "[A]nd this is no less true because the speech comes from a
corporation."1 41 Justice Powell then further restated the issue by asking
"whether the corporate identity of the speaker deprives this proposed speech
of what otherwise would be its clear entitlement to protection."142 One could
fairly infer that Justice Powell had fallen prey to a category-mistake. Did he
realize the distinction between a corporate expenditure and the expression
that it is intended to further? Did he overlook the reality that a corporation is
incapable of expression?
The majority opinion next rejected the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court's conclusion that a corporation's first amendment rights are derived
137. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding contribution limits, but
invalidating expenditure limits of Federal Election Campaign Act).
138. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794-95 (1978) (statute overinclusive because it
prohibits corporate expenditure even if all shareholders agree).
139. Id. at 767.
140. Id. at 776.
141. Id. at 777 (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 778 (emphasis added).
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from its property rights.143 As previously discussed, corporations have, under
the Field rationale, constitutional rights, including certain first amendment
rights in connection with their business to the extent enjoyed by natural
persons in like businesses.144 They possess first amendment rights pursuant to
the associational rationale when they represent the medium through which
natural persons exercise their rights of association and expression. 45 Justice
Powell was thus correct when he rejected the Supreme Judicial Court's
delineation of the first amendment rights of corporations. His opinion,
however, supplied no replacement rationale; it merely rebutted the Supreme
Judicial Court's conclusion,146 pointed out the gaps in Justice Rehnquist's
analysis, 147 and expressed concern about the ramifications of adopting Justice
White's analysis. 148 Justice Powell found comfort in the Supreme Court cases
affording corporations first amendment protection, 4 9 yet he failed to analyze
those cases. Thus he failed to see that they rest on the Field rationale and
accordingly provide no support for his decision.
Having determined that the statute abridged protected expression, Justice
Powell then turned to the question whether the statute could "survive the
exacting scrutiny necessitated by a state-imposed restriction of freedom of
speech."' 150 In order to prevail, the state was required to show a compelling
subordinating interest. 151 The majority opinion identified only two asserted
state interests: That of sustaining the active role of the individual citizen in the
electoral process and that of protecting the rights of shareholders whose views
differ from those expressed by management. 152 Justice Powell concluded that
the state had failed to show that corporate political expenditures presented an
imminent danger to the participation of the individual citizen in the political
process.153 Nor did he find the state interest in protecting shareholders
sufficient justification for the statute's prohibition because the act was both
overinclusive and underinclusive. 154
Only in its discussion of the overinclusiveness of the statute does the
majority hit upon a relevant point. The opinion noted that the statute would
"prohibit a corporation from supporting or opposing a referendum proposal
even if its shareholders unanimously authorized the contribution or expendi-
ture."' 155 Under the associational rationale, given unanimity of desired
expression and desire to express among and between the shareholders and the
natural person actually making the expression, the corporation would have
first amendment rights as the medium of expression.
Overall it would be fair to describe the majority opinion as dismal. The
result is correct, but the analysis is defective and incomplete. The opinion
143. Id. at 784.
144. See text at notes 54-55 supra.
145. See text at notes 118-22supra.
146. See First Natl Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778-95 (1978).
147. Id. at 780-81 n.16.
148. Id. at 781-83nn.17-19.
149. Id. at 780-83.
150. Id. at 786.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 787.
153. Id. at 788-92.
154. Id. at 792-95.
155. Id. at 794.
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essentially ignores precedent and the realities of what a corporation is. Justice
Powell made clear that the decision was not intended to "survey the outer
boundaries of the [first] amendment's protection of corporate speech, or
address the abstract question whether corporations have the full measure of
rights that individuals enjoy under the First Amendment."'1 56 It is fortunate
that the opinion is limited to the facts and that the Supreme Court will be able
to rethink the underlying principles on another day.
In contrast to Justice Powell's opinion, Justice White's analysis in dissent is
truer to both reality and precedent, but he erred in his conclusion that the
statute should be upheld. Justice White more clearly recognized the difference
between a corporate expenditure and the expression that the expenditure is
intended to make possible or amplify. He stated the issue as "whether a State
may prevent corporate management from using the corporate treasury to
propagate views having no connection with the corporate business."z5 7
Drawing on NAACP v. Button158 and the associational theory underlying it,
Justice White noted that corporations can be mediums through which
individuals express their common views. 159 He pointed out, however, that
shareholders in business corporations "do not share a common set of political
or social views, and they certainly have not invested their money for the
purpose of advancing political or social causes." 160 He further concluded that
"there is no basis whatsoever for concluding that these views are expressive of
the heterogeneous beliefs of their shareholders."' 161
Justice White clearly demonstrated here his understanding of the associa-
tional theory. Yet he overlooked the critical fact that unanimity of desire to
express common views can exist in a business corporation, as, for instance, in
a corporation sole in which the shareholder's views are in reality those
expressed. Although the Justice correctly perceived the realities involved and
the applicability of the associational rationale, he failed to perceive that these
realities and the associational rationale make the Massachusetts statute void
on its face because it prohibits protected speech.
White's dissenting opinion contains three other errors that are of interest in
connection with our examination of what the Court might do when again
presented with this issue. First, Justice White prefaced his opinion with the
unsupported statement that "[t]here is now little doubt that corporate
communications come within the scope of the First Amendment."1 62 Clearly
this premise does not accurately reflect precedent. Justice White may have
failed to recognize, as did the majority, that the Court's prior extension of first
amendment rights to corporations in cases other than those based on the
associational rationale are justified by the Field rationale. Justice White's
premise should have been that there is now little doubt that the first
amendment rights of corporations are coextensive with individuals in some
situations and nonexistent in other situations. He should then have applied
the Field and associational rationales to the case.
156. Id. at 777.
157. Id. at 803 (White, J., with Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
158. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
159. See 435 U.S. at 805.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 806.
162. Id. at 804.
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After making this initial mistake, Justice White was forced to suggest that
corporate communication is subject to some restrictions to which individual
expression is not.163 Corporate communication must be limited because
"[i]deas which are not a product of individual choice are entitled to less First
Amendment protection." 164 Obviously the Justice fell prey to category-
mistake. Corporate communication does not exist; only individuals can have
ideas. The corporate expenditure at issue, to the extent it was expression, was
the expression of one or more natural persons. The first question then is whose
speech the expenditure represents. Clearly, it is the speech of those natural
persons who authorize the expenditure. Yet that which is expended belongs
not to them but to the corporation. The associational rationale establishes
that when shareholders utilize a corporation as a medium to express their
common views, it is appropriate to protect that expression. In the case of a
large corporation, however, the views of shareholders an*q management may
diverge, making the associational rationale inapplicable. The issue in that
situation is, in reality, whether the first amendment protects the rights of
management to expend the money of their corporation to further their own
views. No "corporate expression" is involved.
The third mistake in Justice White's dissent follows from the first two.
Justice White is concerned with justifying a prohibition against certain
corporate "speech," while protecting the right of a corporation to advertise.
He justifies first amendment protection for certain corporate communications
through an implied unanimity of business purpose among shareholders in a
business corporation, viewing advertising as a means of furthering the desires
of individuals. 165 In a given situation the shareholders may in fact have such
unanimity of view. But to presume this unanimity for a corporation such as
General Motors is to stretch credulity past the breaking point. Probably all
shareholders wish General Motors to prosper. Not all would wish to express
the opinion that an Oldsmobile Cutlass is a great buy. Indeed, some
shareholders certainly believe that General Motors should advertise more
truthfully, some that it should advertise less truthfully, and some that it
should not advertise at all. A corporation with millions of shareholders
cannot in any meaningful sense be said to be expressing the unanimous views
that its shareholders desire to express when it advertises. By failing to perceive
the Field rationale, Justice White has missed the constitutional basis on which
any first amendment protection for corporate advertising must rest. Cor-
porate advertising is a part of the business. Under the Field rationale it can be
argued that the corporation should have the same first amendment rights for
its advertising that would be available to natural persons conducting a similar
business.
Chief Justice Burger concurred with the majority opinion, but expressed
his concern that there is no principled way to distinguish between a business
corporation and a corporation that is engaged in a communications business,
such as publishing newspapers. He apparently feared that limiting the first
amendment rights of a nonmedia business corporation must inherently lead to
an undermining of the rights of a media corporation as well. 166 Justice Powell
163. Id. at 804-05.
164. Id. at 807.
165. Id. at 808.
166. Id. at 798 & n.2 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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also shared this view.167 The Field rationale makes this concern unwarranted.
A media corporation draws its first amendment rights from the fact that the
expression it desires to protect is part of its business. 168
Justice Rehnquist appears to have grasped the Field raionale in his dissent,
but he totally overlooked the associational rationale and the cases underlying
it. In addition, his opinion implied that the Field rationale is based in part on
the reserved right of the state, as the creator of a corporation, to regulate it,
rather than on the inherent nature of the corporation as an artificial entity. 169
This mistake leaves Justice Rehnquist open to Justice Powell's criticism that
such rationale would not empower a state to restrain corporations created
under the laws of the United States. 170 The critical error is Justice Rehnquist's
failure to perceive the existence of the associational rationale.
Because section eight of the Massachusetts statute was impermissibly
overbroad, the Court reached the right result in First National Bank,
although it perceived the correct reason for the result only dimly at best. The
majority clearly could not see how a conceptually acceptable line of analysis
could be drawn from the cases in which it had previously granted first
amendment rights to corporations and be extended to cases that it might yet
face. Justice White's dissent seemed more aware of the realities involved, but
his opinion still strikes far wide of the mark. Justice Rehnquist at least set out
a partial analysis of some of the cases underlying the Field rationale, and
Chief Justice Burger showed concern for the implications of a decision
upholding section eight for media corporations.
167. Id. at 791 n.30.
168. This conclusion appears to have been shared by Senator Taft of Ohio, and presumably other
members of Congress, as indicated by the following dialogue during Senator Taft's presentation to the
Senate of the views of the Senate conferees about the intended scope of one of the predecessors to present
§ 441b, which governed political contributions by labor unions:
Mr. Barkley. The Senator from Ohio referred to the law prohibiting the making of direct
or indirect contributions by corporations as a justification for making the same provision in
the case of labor unions. Let us consider the publication of a corporation which, day after day,
takes a position against one candidate and in favor of another candidate, and does so in its
editorials. The editorials occupy space in that newspaper or publication, and the space costs a
certain amount of money. Is that a direct or an indirect contribution to a campaign; and if it is
neither, what is it?
Mr. Taft. I would say that it is the operation of the newspaper itself.
Mr. Barkley. That is true; it is the operation of the newspaper. But I gathered the
impression that in referring to the present law prohibiting the making of contributions,
directly or indirectly by corporations, the Senator inferred that if a corporation publishes a
newspaper-as most of them do-and uses the editorials in that publication in advocacy of or
opposition to any candidate, at least that is a direct contribution to the campaign. It could not
be anything else.
Mr. Taft. I do not think it is either a direct or an indirect contribution. I do not think it is
an expenditure of the sort prohibited, because it seems to me it is simply the ordinary
operation of the particular corporation's business.
93 CONG. REc. 6437 (1947) (introducing Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, ch.
120, tit. III, § 304, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)).
169. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822-27 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
170. See id. at 778 n.14.
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IV. AFTER First National Bank
Because the 1980 Presidential election campaign is already underway, the
Supreme Court may be required, in the context of determining the validity of
section 441b of the Federal Election Campaign Act, to consider again the
extent to which corporations may avail themselves of first amendment
protection.171 Section 441b of the Act makes it unlawful for "any corporation
organized by authority of any law of Congress to make a contribution or
expenditure . . . " in connection with any election to political office,
primary, or political convention or caucus.172 The section also makes it
unlawful for an officer or director of a corporation "to consent to any
contribution or expenditures by the corporation, prohibited by this sec-
tion. ' 173 The section applies to labor unions and national banks as well as to
corporations. 174 The Supreme Court has never directly passed on the validity
of section 441b or its predeccessors. 175
In contrast to this treatment of corporations, the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act allows natural persons to make contributions, within limits, to
candidates and political committees in connection with federal election
contests. 176 Moreover, as a result of the Court's decision in Buckley v.
Valeo,177 natural persons may make unlimited expenditures in connection
with federal election contests as long as these expenditures are made
independent of, and without coordination with, a candidate or a political
committee. 178
It is crucial to understand how the Buckley result was reached. The Court
in Buckley reasoned that both political contributions and independent
political expenditures are forms of expression akin to speech and are therefore
protected -by the first amendment. 179 Limitations on contributions, however,
were considered a less severe restriction on first amendment rights than
limitations on independent expenditures180 because a "contribution serves as a
general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not
communicate the underlying basis for the support."'181 The quantity of
171. See Federal Election Campaign Act, § 112(2), 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976). A more carefully drawn or
more narrowly construed state statute prohibiting corporate expenditures in connection with election
campaigns or referenda might also be open to challenge. See note 14 supra for some prior lower court cases.
Another possible case might arise if Congress were to prohibit or limit corporate expenditures to further, as
by paid advertisement, the expression of general social or ideological views. Such a case is far less likely to
arise in the present political climate, however; therefore, this article will consider in depth only the
challenge to § 441b, which is the most likely to occur.
172. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1976).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See United States v. International Union United Auto. Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers, 352
U.S. 567, 591 (1957) (no decision on consitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 610, forbidding corporate or labor
contribution or expenditure on federal elections, because not absolutely necessary to decision); United
States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 110 (1948) (no decision on constitutionality of § 313 of Federal Corrupt
Practices Act, forbidding corporate expenditures for political activities, because indictment did not state
offense under that section).
176. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1976).
177. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
178. Id. at 51.
179. Id. at 16.
180. Id. at 20-21, 23.
181. Id. at 21.
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communication is thus not materially affected by the size of the contribu-
tion,182 although contribution limits may indirectly restrict the expression of
the party to whom the contributor would otherwise give a larger amount. By
contrast, the Court found that a restriction on an independent expenditure
would directly limit the quantity of communication. 183 Accordingly, it upheld
limits on contributions, but not on independent expenditures to promote a
political candidate. 184
It seems inevitable that a challenge will be made to section 441b. The
challengers will assert that Buckley v. Valeo has extended to natural persons
limited rights to make political contributions and unlimited rights to make
independent political expenditures. It will further be asserted that First
National Bank makes it clear that corporations must not be denied first
amendment rights merely because they are corporations.185 Accordingly, it
will be argued, section 441b must be unconstitutional.
Both the majority and the dissents in First National Bank seemed to share a
visceral belief that section 441b should be constitutional, although none of the
opinions provided a basis for this feeling. The implications of the First
National Bank decision were of great concern to Justice White, who noted in
his dissent:
[T]he Court has previouly held in Buckley v. Valeo that the interest
in preventing corruption is insufficient to justify restrictions upon
individual expenditures relative to candidates for political office. If
the corporate identity of the speaker makes no difference, all the
Court has done is to reserve the formal interment of the Corrupt
Practices Act and similar state statutes for another day. 186
Justice Powell in his majority opinion suggested that section 441b could be
found constitutional if Congress could "demonstrate the existence of a danger
of real or apparent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to
influence candidate elections."1 87 He does not explain why this course is open
to the Court in light of Buckley v. Valeo. The reason for the Justices' difficulty
in indicating a basis for upholding section 441b was their failure to grasp the
realities involved in corporate political expenditures. As demonstrated in
their analysis of First National Bank, they failed to perceive both who was
actually speaking and the underlying rationale behind prior decisions. 188
In considering a challenge to section 441b, the Court can be certain to
reach the correct result only if it avoids the category-mistakes made in First
National Bank. To avoid these mistakes the Court must first divide corporate
expenditures in connection with federal elections into two categories: Those
made by a corporation in which the shareholders and the agents of the
corporation authorizing and directing the expenditure are united by a desire
and intent to express, through the expenditure, a common belief or opinion;
182. Id.
183. Id. at 19.
184. Id. at 29, 51.
185. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 (1978).
186. Id. at 820-21 (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 788 n.26.
188. See notes 140-70 supra and accompanying text (discussing First Nat'l Bank).
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and all other expenditures. Only the former fall within the associational
rationale.'
The Court in First National Bank showed some awareness that the speech
represented by a corporate expenditure was different in cases covered by the
associational rationale than in cases outside that rationale. Both Justice
Powell for the majority189 and Justice White, in his dissent, analyzed the
difference 90 in connection with the Court's holdings in International Associa-
tion of Machinists v. Street 91 and Abood v. Detroit Board of Education 92
In Street the Court construed the Railway Labor Act to deny unions the
power to use compulsory union dues obtained over an employee's objection
for political purposes the employee opposed. 193 The associational rationalejustifies and is consistent with the statute-based holding in Street. As long as
the members of a union share with their representatives a desire to express
common views, the union is merely the medium of the members' expression.
In such a case an expenditure by a union can be properly thought -of as the
expression of each of its members. Once this unanimity of view vanishes, first
amendment protection would also be inappropriate. Similarly, in Abood the
Court on first amendment grounds held that the state could not require an
individual to contribute to a public employee's union as a condition of
employment to the extent that his contribution would be used to support an
ideological cause with which he did not agree. 194
In First National Bank Justice White interpreted these decisions to mean
that when state action is involved an individual may not be compelled to
support views with which he disagrees and that the state can enact laws to
protect the first amendment interests. 95 Justice Powell agreed that these cases
involved coerced contributions to further the views of others. He found no
coercion present, however, in the case of a shareholder of a corporation that
makes a contribution with which the shareholder disagrees, because the
shareholder may sell his holdings at any time. 196
Inherent in the analysis of both Justice Powell and Justice White is the
assumption that an expenditure of corporate assets involves expression by the
shareholders of the corporation, although they differ about whether the
expression is compelled or coerced. This assumption evinces a critical
category-mistake. The expression in such a case is that of management, or
whoever authorizes and directs the expenditure. The individual shareholder
has in no sense engaged in an act of expression. He and the other shareholders
have merely continued to hold shares in the corporation from which
management has, for its own expression, extracted assets.
In order to uphold section 441b, then, the Supreme Court must construe
the section as inapplicable to expenditures falling within this first category.
Under the associational rationale such corporate expenditures are constitu-
tionally protected to the same extent as like expenditures of natural persons
associated in an unincorporated form. The speech made possible by the
189. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978).
190. Id. at 813-14.
191. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
192. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
193. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768-69 (1961).
194. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977).
195. 435 U.S. at 814.
196. Id. at 794 n.34.
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expenditure is that of natural persons. The corporation, as the medium for
this expression, has first amendment rights in connection with it. Without
such a construction, section 441b would be impermissibly overbroad.
In the second category of expenditures, in which unanimity of view does
not exist, the expression represented by an expenditure is still that of natural
persons. But the speaker now does not represent all of the shareholders and
the corporate agents. As an example of such a situation, let us assume that the
expenditure is authorized and directed by top management and constitutes an
expression of their common support for candidate X. The corporation in this
case is not being utilized as a medium of expression by its owner or members.
Instead, top management is using the assets of the corporation to further their
own views. In order to avoid category-mistake and therefore to have any hope
of reaching a sound decision concerning the validity of section 441b, the
Court must realize that an expenditure of corporate assets authorized and
directed by top management is the expression of top management. It is not the
expression of the corporation because a corporation is incapable of expres-
sion. Unlike a corporation fitting the associational rationale, this corporation,
as a corporation, has no first amendment rights in connection with this
expenditure.
Top management, in contrast, does have first amendment rights. The
Court must thus consider the extent of those individuals' first amendment
rights in connection with expression accomplished with assets of the corpora-
tion. A prohibition of corporate expenditures does not constitute a prohibi-
tion of expenditures by top management from their own resources. Top
management remains free to expend their own resources to the extent other
natural persons are permitted to do so. Is the freedom of expression of the
individual members of top management therefore infringed by restricting
their use of corporate assets? Does management lack standing to challenge
this prohibition because it does not in any way prohibit members of top
management from making personal political expenditures?
The Supreme Court has considered a similar issue in Cammarano v. United
States.197 Two of the petitioners in Cammarano were engaged in an unincor-
porated form in the business of distributing beer wholesale in the State of
Washington. Voters in that state were to consider an initiative measure to
place the retail sale of beer and wine in the hands of the state. 198 Petitioners
contributed money to an industry fund to purchase advertisements urging
defeat of the measure and claimed a deduction for these contributions on their
income tax returns for the years in which they were made. The Internal
Revenue Service disallowed the deduction. Petitioners asserted that the
deduction was an ordinary and necessary business expense under section
23(a)(1)(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.199 They further argued that
if the IRS regulations were construed to deny them a deduction, the
disallowance would constitute an abridgment of their first amendment
rights.2 00 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Harlan, held that the regulations
197. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
198. Id. at 500.
199. Id. at 501.
200. Id. at 512-13.
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did deny such a deduction 201 and gave short shrift to petitioners' first
amendment argument:
Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they
engage in constitutionally protected activities, but are simply being
required to pay for those activities entirely out of their own pockets,
as everyone else engaging in similar activities is required to do
under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Nondiscrimina-
tory denial of deduction from gross income to sums expended to
promote or defeat legislation is plainly not "aimed at the suppres-
sion of dangerous ideas." Rather, it appears to us to express a
determination by Congress that since purchased publicity can
influence the fate of legislation which will affect, directly or
indirectly, all in the community, everyone in the community
should stand on the same footing as regards its purchase so far as
the Treasury of the United States is concerned.202
Is not the determination by Congress in section 441b that top management
should be denied the use of the corporate treasury justified under the equal
footing analysis used so eloquently by Justice Harlan in Cammarano? This
restriction involves no discrimination or desire to suppress the views of
management, but only a nondiscriminatory denial to any individual with
greater access to resources than that available to other individuals. Not only
may members of top management expend their own assets, but they may also,
individually or in association with others, solicit contributions from those
who desire to assist them in expressing their views. Section 441b can be
considered merely an attempt to deny corporate management an unfair
advantage.
Prohibiting expenditures not encompassed by the associational rationale
protects society's interest in having each member of society stand on the same
footing with regard to using the funds of others to express himself. Although a
particular dissident shareholder may be aware of and enraged by manage-
ment's use of corporate assets to express views with which he disagrees, the
major interest served by a prohibition on these expenditures is not protecting
the shareholder, but protecting the broader interest of society. The share-
holder may have a unique personal interest in damages to his property interest
as a shareholder if the expenditures are construed as waste, self-dealing, or
ultra vires. This issue is a separate one that should not be confused with the
important societal interest of requiring that all members of society be given an
equal chance to convince others that their views are worthy of further
expression and that others should aid that expression by a contribution of
money.
Upholding the constitutionality of section 441b would also not infringe the
first amendment rights of listeners to hear the desired speech. As Justice
Powell noted in First National Bank, the Court's commercial speech cases
make clear that certain speech is protected from governmental limitation
because of the right of the listener to hear that speech.203 The first amendment
201. Id. at 510.
202. Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
203. 435 U.S. at 783.
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forbids the suppression of commercial communication because the "people
will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough in-
formed. ' 20 4 The commercial speech cases, however, involve prohibitions of
speech that are clearly not motivated by equal footing concerns. These cases
involve attempts by government to prevent totally a particular message from
being communicated. 205 By contrast, a ban on corporate political expenditures
is not an attempt to prevent the expression of a particular message. Rather, it
represents a legislative determination that all who desire to amplify their
expression by the use of the assets of others must obtain those assets from
voluntary contributions instead of from the corporate treasury. No attempt is
made to prevent those in management from using their own assets to further
their own expression, a right guaranteed by Buckley v. Valeo.206 Nor is there
any limit on the amount of contributed money that can be used to further this
expression.
Moreover, the prohibition of section 441b against corporate political
expenditures not only does not prevent the expression of a particular view, but
also is based on, and results in, an enhancement of the first amendment rights
of the listener. In the commercial speech cases the emphasis is solely on the
listener as potential customer, not on the rights of the listener as potential
speaker. Prohibiting corporate political expenditures focuses attention on the
rights of the listener as listener and as potential speaker. As a potential
speaker every citizen must have certain rights of equal opportunity to solicit
contributions to further his or her own expression. A citizen's rights as
listener and as speaker are not separable in the area of political expression,
and section 441b protects them both.
Section 441b represents a congressional determination that all who desire
to amplify their speech by the use of assets not their own must obtain those
assets from voluntary contributions. This prohibition is necessarily grounded
on a congressional realization that corporate management has been clothed
by government with tremendous discretion in the management of corporate
affairs. A law that requires those in management to look to voluntary
contributions rather than the corporate treasury to further their own
expression ensures that those who control corporations by virtue of the
corporate management powers and privileges that the government has
created and fostered also will not have unfair access to the assets of others.
Such a law is justified, to paraphrase Justice Harlan's reasoning in Cam-
marano,20 7 because political speech will affect all in the community. All, as
204. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976) (state law forbidding pharmacists from advertising prescription drugs struck down).
205. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 374 (1977) (state ban on attorney advertising
denies consumer relevant information needed to reach an informed decision); Linmark Assoc. v. Township
of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977) (ordinance prohibiting posting of "For Sale" or "Sold" signs
prevents residents from obtaining certain information and violates first amendment); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (state law forbidding
pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices suppresses flow of information to consumers).
206. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976) (per curiam). This part of the Buckley decision has been
both praised and criticized. Compare Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech, in
1976 Sup. Cr. REV. 1, 42 (P. Kurland ed.) (Court successfully balanced individual interest in unlimited
speech against collective interest in honest democracy) with Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money
Speech? 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1005 (1976) (Court's view in Buckley that "money is speech" misconceives the
first amendment).
207. See notes 197-202 supra and accompanying text.
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potential listener-speakers, should stand on the same footing with regard to
obtaining the assets of others for use in the amplification of their speech when
governmentally created and fostered advantages are only available to some.
In sum, the Court must begin its analysis with a proper classification of
corporate expenditures. It must then construe section 441b so that it will not
apply to corporations protected by the associational rationale. The Court
should note that speech not covered by this rationale involves only speech by
top management or whoever authorizes and directs the expenditure. The
Court should employ an equal footing justification, as found in Cammarano,
to uphold the validity of the restriction of section 441b 208 on corporate
political expenditures.
The Court may be able to support its visceral feeling that section 441b
should withstand a constitutional challenge2 9 without reassessing its mud-
208. Section 441b(b)(4)(B) provides that "it shall not be unlawful . . . for a corporation . . . or a
separate segregated fund established by such corporation . . . to make 2 written solicitations for
contributions during the calendar year from any stockholder, executive or administrative personnel, or
employee of a corporation. ... 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(B) (1976). Section 441b(b)(3)(B) makes it
unlawful "for any person soliciting an employee for a contribution to such a fund to fail to inform such
employee of the political purposes of such fund at the time of such solicitation. ... 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(b)(3)(B) (1976). And section 437d(a)(6) empowers the Federal Election Commission to initiate
civil actions to enforce, among other things, § 441b. 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a)(6) (1976).
As noted, the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo held that no limit could be placed on "independent
expenditures" advocating the election or defeat of a candidate to federal office. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 51 (per curiam) (1976); notes 177-78 supra and accompanying text. The Federal Election
Commission, pursuant to its rulemaking authority under § 437d(a)(8), and in light of Buckley, has
interpreted independent expenditures to include expenditures by a separate segregated fund established by
a corporation, but not expenditures by a corporation. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.1(a), (b)(1) (1977). These
separate segregated funds are commonly referred to as political action committees. The effect of § 441b
under this interpretation is to allow management to set up political action committees to solicit voluntary
contributions from its employees; these contributions can then be used to amplify the views of
management. This scheme correctly recognizes the rights of corporate management, as individuals, to
solicit contributions for the furtherance of their individual political views. At the same time, by prohibiting
management from using corporate funds for amplification of their own views, this interpretation
neutralizes the governmentally created advantages otherwise available to management and ensures that
management is not given an unfair headstart in obtaining contributions.
Section 441b(b)(2)(C) appears to allow corporate expenditures that are not constitutionally protected by
exempting from the definition of "contribution or expenditure" "the establishment, administration, and
solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a
corporation. ... Without this exception, the use of corporate assets when the ultime intended result is to
enable managment to obtain the money of others for amplification of management's views would constitute
an expressive act by management. Such expenditures would be entitled to no greater first amendment
protection than expenditures made directly by management to amplify their own views.
On the other hand, § 441b(b)(4)(A)(i) appears at first blush to restrict unconstitutionally the rights of
management by making it unlawful "for a corporation, or a separate segregated fund established by a
corporation, to solicit contributions to such a fund from any person other than its stockholders and their
families and its executive or administrative personnel and their families .... " How can the possible
sources of contributions be constitutionally limited? The answer lies in the interplay between
§ 441b(b)(2)(C) and § 441b(b)(4)(A)(i). Section 441b(b)(2)(C) allows management, through a political
action committee, to use corporate assets to solicit contributions from shareholders and employees of the
corporation. Section 441b(b)(4)(A)(i) merely prohibits management from using corporate funds for
solicitation from other sources. Thus § 441b(b)(4)(A)(i) should properly be construed as permitting
management to solicit contributions from whomever it wishes as long as it does not avail itself of the
constitutionally unrequired advantage granted by § 441b(b)(2)(C).
Section 441b prohibits expenditures in connection with only federal elections. There is no prohibition
against expenditures in connection with general political or social expression.
209. See notes 186-88 supra and accompanying text.
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dled holding in First National Bank.210 The addition of another layer of shaky
doctrine and reasoning based upon the unsatisfactory foundation of First
National Bank, however, would push farther from the body of the Court'sjurisprudence the historically and conceptually correct principles that sup-
ported the Court's decisions prior to First National Bank.
The greatest cause for concern is that this flawed analytical structure may
cause an incorrect result in a case in which the Justices' ideological leanings
and analytical misconceptions suggest a different result than application of
correct principles might require. Corporate expenditure to influence the vote
on a referendum issue is an area in which the Court has already faltered in
First National Bank and it may do so again. The greatest risk of error may lie
in the area of general social expression. When Mobil Oil Corporation
purchases an advertisement that promotes a particular social view, the real
speaker is again top management. Should not Congress have the power to
deny top management access to the corporate treasury based on an equal-
footing rationale? Management could spend its own personal funds or solicit,
individually or collectively, contributions from others to further their expres-
sion. This congressional action would not prevent the actual expression, but
would only place all individuals at the same starting point.
It is difficult to predict the possible consequences of a decision by the
Supreme Court giving those in management, or those in control of a
corporation, a constitutionally protected right of access to corporate funds to
promote their own views. As more and more corporations mutate into
multinational creatures of immense power and influence, would it not be wise
to preserve the ability of Congress to enact legislation to curb the headstart on
expression and influence that the corporate treasury affords top management?
It is to be hoped that the Court's future decisions will avoid category-mistake
and preserve the possibility of political action in this area.
CONCLUSION
Prior to First National Bank the Supreme Court had carefully delineated
the constitutional rights of a corporation, although it had not set forth in
those decisions a unifying rationale. The principles deduced from these prior
decisions are both mutually consistent and free of the category-mistake of
treating corporations as either natural persons or creatures capable of
physical acts such as speech or expression.
In determining whether a particular right is applicable to corporations, the
Court, under the Field rationale, has extended to corporations the same
constitutional rights in connection with their businesses that natural persons
would have in connection with similar businesses. Constitutional rights that
by their very nature can only apply to a natural person have not been
extended to corporations. The Court has noted, however, that a corporation,
although physically incapable of speech, may be utilized by its shareholders as
a medium for the expression of their common views. In such limited cases a
corporation, as the medium of expression, has first amendment rights.
The Court in First National Bank has indicated its lack of understanding of
both its prior body of decisions and of the reality of whose speech is involved
210. See notes 124-70 supra and accompanying text.
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in the case of a corporate expenditure. Except in those cases in which the
shareholders and the party directing the expenditure share a desire to express
common views, the speech is in no sense that of the corporation. In most
situations the speech will be that of one or more members of the top
management.
In reaching future decisions regarding limitations on corporate expendi-
tures, the Court, to make proper analysis possible, must realize that the
speech represented by the expenditure is that of the natural persons who
authorize and direct it. From this starting point, the Court can then logically
proceed to determine the permissible limitations on the expression.

